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THE FIRST AMENDMENT RECONSIDERED: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON
THE MEANING OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS. Edited by Bil!

F. Chamberlin and Charlene J. Brown. New York: Longman Inc.
1982. Pp. ix, 218. $27.95.
The range of potential first amendment topics obviously prevents any
single-volume attempt at comprehensive treatment. Yet the common theoretical bases underlying freedom of speech and press provide a vehicle for
cohesive presentation of divergent viewpoints under the general heading of
the first amendment. The First Amendment Reconsidered consists of four
articles 1 selected from a national competition on first amendment theory,
and three presentations2 by first amendment scholars and attorneys. The
book is essentially a grab-bag of essays which address widely divergent
speech and press topics. The preface, however, encourages readers to view
the collection as a "symposium" which will enhance their understanding of
the first amendment (p. xv). While the book does not provide as many
instances of the implicitly promised interactions as might be desired, it does
assemble scholarly thought surrounding similar basic themes.
The first selection is Margaret Blanchard's Filling in the Void· Speech
and Press in State Courts Prior to Git/ow (pp. 14-59). Blanchard seeks to
refute the "traditional notion"3 that there was no important development of
speech and press issues during the period between the Alien and Sedition
Acts of 1798 and the Supreme Court's entry into the area in 1925 with Gitlow v. New York. 4 She examines state court decisions involving speech and
press issues from 1798 to 1925 and concludes that these decisions laid a firm
foundation for later Supreme Court activity and had a "significant impact"
on the freedom of speech and press (p. 42).
Blanchard regards her work as "skim[ming] the surface of the possible
areas for investigation" (p. 43). This is accurate; the article fails to establish
how much influence these state court decisions have had on later developments in first amendment law. Her article should thus be viewed as only a
starting point for those interested in first amendment history.
In The Deceptive "Right to Know'~· How Pessimism Rewrote the First
Amendment, Baldasty and Simpson suggest that the first amendment primarily protects individual freedom. They argue that "[f]ree speech is prel. Blanchard, Filling in the Void: Speech and Press in State Courts prior to Git/ow; Baldasty
& Simpson, The Deceptive "Right to Know''.· How Pessimism Rewrote the First Amendment;
Stonecipher, Safeguarding Speech and Press Guarantees: Preferred Position Postulate Reexamined; Hodge, Democracy and Free Speech: A Normative Theory of Society and Government.
2. Howard, The Burger Court and the First Amendment: Pulling a Decade into Perspective,
pt. I: A Framework; Abrams, The Burger Court and the First Amendment: Pulling a Decade
into Perspective, pt. 2: An Analysis; Watts,A Major Issue of the 1980's: New Communication
Tools.
3. See z. CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 14-15 (1941); T.EMERSON,
THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 5 (1970); T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 35-36 (1966).
4. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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cisely that: a right to speak" because "we always have understood the
fundamental linkage between individual freedom and a healthy, self-governing society" (p. 80). On the other hand, Baldasty and Simpson acknowledge that the first amendment's protection of free speech is based on the
need for public information (p. 82). They fear, however, the loss of ideas
that might result if speakers are regulated to provide listeners with diverse
information, for "[i]t is the speaker who is more highly motivated to secure
his right, will press harder to achieve it, and may have more power to succeed . . . ." (p. 81).5 Baldasty and Simpson thus assume that sufficiently
diverse sources will channel information to the public if all speakers are
free to deliver their messages and that all speakers have the same ability to
deliver their messages to the public.
In Sefeguarding Speech and Press Guarantees: Preferred Position Poslll·
late Reexamined, Stonecipher claims that a preference for both speech and
press is deeply rooted in United States history (pp. 89-128). The "preferred
position postulate" generally holds that freedom of expression, so essential
to the exercise of many other basic freedoms, needs to be weighted by the
''judicial thumb" in the balancing of interests process (p. 90). Stonecipher
approvingly identifies a variety of devices used by the Supreme Court to
maintain the preferred position of speech and press.6 But the very tradition
of special protection to which Stonecipher points suggests that his comments do more to celebrate the status quo than to break new ground in first
amendment theory.
In The Burger Court and the First Amendment: Putting a .Decade into
Perspective, A. E. Dick Howard and Floyd Abrams each examine the performance of the Burger Court (pp. 129-45). Howard finds that the Burger
Court of the early seventies was "less activist, less aggressive, less egalitarian, (and) more deferential to the country's legislative and political process" than was the Warren Court (p. 131). By the late seventies, he says, the
Burger Court's performance became "so episodic as sometimes to seem random" (p. 131). Howard describes the Court's fluid voting pattern and general distaste for categorical rulemaking, concluding that the Court's
behavior reflects its feeling that there are no neat and simple answers to the
problems it confronts (p. 134).
Abrams focuses on the Burger Court's treatment of freedom of the press
cases and finds a consistent pattern. He asserts that the Court reviews press
victories and refuses to review press losses. Moreover, the Court "reaches"
for freedom of expression cases that the press has won in lower courts even when these cases are ones that the Court would not otherwise hear
(pp. 139-41). This is an interesting and plausible speculation, but, like
many constitutional partisans, Abrams may read too much into patterns of
Supreme Court case selection. One wonders, too, whether Abrams would
applaud the court for affirming rather than declining to review lower court
decisions he finds unpalatable.
5. Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. I, 4.
6. Among these is the "actual malice" rule in libel law. See New York Times Co, v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). Although Stonecipher shares the concerns of Baldasty and
Simpson about the limitations of the rule (pp. 70-74), he says that the rule generally places the
press and citizen critic in a preferred position. Pp. 103-04.
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InJJemocracy and Free Speech: A Normative Theory of Society and Government, Hodge argues that the Supreme Court must adopt a carefully articulated theory of the first amendment before it can decide first
amendment cases clearly or consistently (pp. 148-80). He proposes a "normative theory of government" and applies his theory to the right of free
speech. Hodge explains that any speech which directly affects the electoral
process is at the core of the basic free speech right. There must be sufficient
communication about the electoral process to prevent any voter from being
denied reasons for voting in any particular way (pp. 156-59). Hodge assumes that the government must actively promote voter access to political
information. He criticizes the laissez faire "marketplace of ideas" concept
as a "faulty analogy" (p. 163). Not only is the laissez faire model an unsound economic theory, but its application to the realm of speech and ideas
obscures the harm worked by unrestrained private forces (pp. 162-63).
Finally, inA Major Issue of the 1980's: New Communication Tools (pp.
181-93), Watts examines the effect of new technologies upon first amendment doctrine. He sees the preservation of an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas as the goal of the first amendment (p. 190). Watts asserts that the new
communications technologies have the capacity to expand the diversity of
viewpoints flowing to the public far beyond current limits (p. 186). However, current government regulation and Supreme Court doctrine have
failed to keep pace with the rapid technological advancement. The result,
he says, is a slew of unanswered first amendment questions in such areas as
ownership and control of the new communications systems, access to the
systems, and protection of the privacy of users of new two-way systems (pp.
185-91).7
Although these articles address a broad array of topics, there are some
consistent themes. One of the interesting issues that emerges from the collection is whether the first amendment protects the rights of speakers, the
communication process itself, or the listener's right to information.
Baldasty and Simpson argue that the first amendment protects the right to
speak, not the right to know (pp. 62-88). Hodge, on the other hand, develops a first amendment right of free speech which differs from the speaker's
right advocated by Baldasty and Simpson (pp. 148-80). He states at the
beginning and at the end of his essay that his free speech right includes the
rights of both speakers and listeners (pp. 152, 171). But in the body of the
article Hodge makes it clear that his free speech right is primarily a protection of the communication process (p. 163).8
7. Watt agrees with Professor Bollinger that because regulation of electronic media has
been traditionally justified by the scarcity rationale, technological advances that have increased access threaten the theoretical base of the fairness doctrine. P. 188. See Bollinger,
Elitism, The Masses And The Idea Of Seif-Government: Ambivalence About The "Central
Meaning Of The First Amendment," in CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 99, 103
(R. Collins ed. 1980). While Watt does not develop this theory further, Bollinger suggests that
broadcast regulation can be explained by the remnant scarcity rationale as well as an elitist
desire to protect a citizen from messages that are regarded as dangerous or harmful. Under
this view, the demise of media scarcity would lay bare the paternalistic distrust of the citizenry
and its ability to discern and reject unworthy messages. Although Professor Schmidt has defended this elitism on its own merits, B. SCHMIDT, JR., FREEDOM OF THE PRESS vs. PUBLIC
ACCESS (1976), the result of such an exposure may be future relaxation of the fairness doctrine.
8. Professor O'Brien provides well-reasoned agreement with Hodge. D. O'BRIEN, THE
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Another recurring theme is the appropriate form and scope of media
regulation. Baldasty and Simpson adhere to a laissez faire view of a free
marketplace of ideas, maintaining that only the right to speak need be protected by appropriate constitutional safeguards. Baldasty and Simpson criticize the fairness doctrine9 of broadcast regulation, which they view as the
result of the Supreme Court's "parental, almost condescending view of the
audience" as myopic and gullible (p. 76). 10
Watt, on the other hand, argues that increased and updated government
regulation is necessary to "preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas" in
this time of rapid technological advancement (pp. 190-91).
Hodge criticizes the laissez faire marketplace of ideas concept as a
"faulty analogy'' (p. 163). Hodge thus goes beyond Professor Barron's view
that if a self-operating marketplace of ideas ever existed, it has long since
disappeared. 11 He agrees with Barron that modem day concentration of
media ownership 12 requires active government intervention to preserve the
diversity of opinions (p. 166).
The contributions to The First Amendment Reconsidered offer thoughtprovoking and informative comments on a range of contemporary issues in
the law of free expression. But the absence of unifying theory or of wider
perspectives on basic political theory and the dynamics of regulation precludes any satisfying conceptualization of the first amendment's basic mission. What the book makes clear is that modem first amendment theory
· works backwards from agreed conclusions; hard cases reveal the inadequacy of current doctrine, bringing devoted defenders of free expression in
general into profound conflict over the application of that principle in unanticipated situations. What is needed now, perhaps, is not another demonstration that thoughtful people may assign different purposes to the first
amendment, but wider searchings toward a comprehensive theory of how
and why society should protect the unfettered exchange of ideas in a modem technological environment.

PUBLIC'S RIGHT To KNOW: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1981). According to one commentator, the Supreme Court interprets the first amendment as a regulatory
principle protecting the "freedom of those activities of thought and communication by which
we 'govern' rather than the freedom to speak." Meiklejohn, The Firs/ Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, cited in O'BRIEN at 144. O'Brien carefully distinguishes protection of the communication process, which he praises, from protection ofa public right to know,
which he criticizes. Baldasty and Simpson fail to draw this distinction, or to explain exactly
what their "right to know" encompasses. The reader interested in pursuing the issue of what
the free speech guarantee primarily protects will find the O'Brien book a better-reasoned and
more complete source than anything 17ze Firs/ Amendment Reconsidered has to offer.
9. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
10. This echoes Professor Bollinger's point that paternalism or "elitism" is a factor behind
the elaborate government regulation of broadcasting. See Bollinger, supra note 7.
11. Barron,Access lo the Press-A New First Amendment Righi, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641
(1967).
12. Id at 1643, 1655-56. See generally Schmidt, supra note 7, at 37-54.

